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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4511
There has been a proliferation of non-state providers 
of education services in the developing world.  In 
Bangladesh, for instance, Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee runs more than 40,000 non-formal schools 
that cater to school-drop outs from poor families or 
operate in villages where there’s little provision for 
formal schools. This paper presents a rationale for 
supporting these schools on the basis of their spillover 
effects on female enrollment in secondary (registered) 
madrasa schools (Islamic faith schools). Most madrasa 
high schools in Bangladesh are financed by the sate 
and include a modern curriculum alongside traditional 
religious subjects.  Using an establishment-level dataset 
on student enrollment in secondary schools and 
madrasas, the authors demonstrate that the presence 
This paper—a product of the South Asia Human Development Unit—is part of a larger effort in the unit to promote 
research and impact evaluations in the education sector of the South Asia Region. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at nchaudhury@worldbank.org.  
of madrasas is positively associated with secondary 
female enrollment growth. Such feminization of 
madrasas is therefore unique and merits careful analysis. 
The authors test the effects of the Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee primary schools on growth in 
female enrollment in madrasas. The analysis deals with 
potential endoegeneity by using data on number of the 
number of school branches and female members in the 
sub-district. The findings show that madrasas that are 
located in regions with a greater number of Bangladesh 
Rural Advancement Committee schools have higher 
growth in female enrollment. This relationship is further 
strengthened by the finding that there is, however, no 
effect of these schools on female enrollment growth in 
secular schools.
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1. Introduction 
Despite the need to provide public services in hard to reach poor areas, governments in 
many part of the developing world are stymied by fiscal and institutional constraints 
(World Bank 2003).  Even if it is possible to find the public funds to hire and post public 
sector teachers and doctors in poor rural villages and urban slums, the efficacy of such 
public provision is often severely compromised.  For example, absenteeism of service 
providers is a major problem in many rural areas (Chaudhury et al 2006).  Even if the 
providers bother to show up, the quality of their services in terms of impact on schooling 
and health outcomes is often weak.  One possible way of circumventing bureaucratic 
inertia and government capacity constraints is by contracting-out services to NGOs and 
private providers (Chaudhury and Devarajan 2006).  Cambodia has had some success 
with this approach.  For example, despite considerable international donor funding in 
Cambodia to resurrect the public health care system in the aftermath of the reign of the 
Khmer Rouge, delivery of health services by the public system continued to suffer from 
severe institutional failures (e.g., high levels of doctor absenteeism, widespread pilfering 
of medicines).  Recognizing that these structural problems would be difficult to address 
within the bureaucratic confines of the public sector, the Health Ministry took a 
pragmatic decision to hand over health system management in several districts to NGOs 
backed by public financing.  Rigorous evaluation has shown that districts managed by the 
NGOs are much more successful in improving health services (and health outcomes) than 
districts run by the government.   
 
In Bangladesh, domestic NGOs have taken the lead in providing services in underserved 
sectors.  Bangladesh has some of the largest and most dynamic education and health 
NGOs in the developing world.  Some have evolved to multi-service entities, such as the 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), which successfully runs 
specialized schools for formerly out-of-school children, has an extensive system of health 
clinics, and provides micro-credit to the poor (besides running chicken cooperatives, 
handicraft boutiques, commercial lending operations, etc).  BRAC is now the largest 
provider of education services after the government in Bangladesh.  BRAC runs over 
40,000 non-formal schools which cater to school-drop outs from poor families or operate 
in villages where there’s little provision for formal schools. The board-base support for 
NGO activities in Bangladesh is because of their pro-poor service delivery. NGOs like 
BRAC not only perform the traditional role of providing the rural poor access to credit, 
they are heavily involved in the provision of various public goods such as health and 
education.  While the government has not contracted-out the services of these major 
NGOs, they have allowed them to operate without too much interference--as long as they 
refrain from explicit political activity (for example, one NGO, Proshika, was sanctioned 
by the government for being too closely associated with the opposition party).  In fact, 
the major NGOs have resisted any explicit contractual arrangements with the 
government.  They are to some extent contracted-out by the international donor 
community (particularly bilateral donors) which provides considerable funding directly to 
major NGOs.  Some of these NGOs might not be able to function at full capacity if there 
is a significant reduction in donor funding.   
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There are very few studies comparing the performance of NGO schools and other 
educational providers1. A notable exception is Sukontamarn (2005) who uses data on 
BRAC schools from Bangladesh and examine the impact of the entry of NGOs in 
primary education on female enrollment2. Sukontamarn finds that the entry of BRAC 
schools significantly increases girls' enrollment as compared to boys. Cohorts which are 
exposed to BRAC schools have higher probability of enrollment and the effect operates 
mainly through female students. However, besides this, we are not aware of any other 
study on the relative performance of NGO schools in Bangladesh. Most importantly, 
there is no study which has examined the potential spillover effects of NGO schools on 
other outcomes such as female participation in secondary schools. Bangladesh has 
recently achieved the remarkable fit of gender parity in secondary enrollment. Therefore, 
understanding the determinants of growth in female enrollment is extremely important 
for other countries who are trying to fulfill the MDG target of closing gender gap in 
secondary education.  
 
Bangladesh provides a unique setting to study the impact of primary, NGO-run schools 
on female enrollment in secondary schools for another reason. There are a large number 
of Islamic faith schools or madrasas for whom, like NGO schools, altruistic motivations 
are the principal determinants of location decisions. On one hand, both serve children 
from socially underprivileged families. On the other hand, they have conflicting 
ideologies and are known to target different gender groups. In other words, madrasas 
oppose NGO activities and have historically educated boys. For instance, registered 
madrasas in Bangladesh during the 1980s were predominantly boys-only with only 7% of 
the total enrolled students being female. However, this has changed in over just one 
decade. By the year 2000, 46% of the students in registered secondary madrasas in the 
country were girls.  
 
Such dramatic feminization of registered secondary madrasas has been attributed to 
introduction of a conditional cash transfer scheme which target female students in 
secondary schools and madrasas. Female enrollment has increased more than five-fold 
since 1994 when the conditional cash transfer scheme was introduced. However, the last 
two decades has also seen a rise in NGO schools at the primary level and given the 
current controversy over madrasa reform, knowledge of any externalities arising from 
NGO schools is extremely important from policy point of view. In this study, by way of 
documenting the process of feminization of madrasas, we examine the impact of BRAC 
schools in the context of the recent rise in female enrollment in government recognized 
secondary madrasas.  
 
                                                 
1 In general, evaluation of the performance of national NGOs is rare. As pointed out by Barr and Fafchamps 
(2005), there have been very few quantitative evaluations of entire countries’ NGO sectors so that little is 
known about the motivations and performance of NGOs in general. Existing published research on 
Bangladeshi NGOs (e.g. Gauri and Galef, 2005; Fruttero and Gauri, 2005) is largely descriptive; they do 
not test relative performance of NGOs with other service providers. 
2 Additional evidence on quality of BRAC schools is also provided by Asadullah, Chaudhury and Dar 
(2007). Studies on the relative performance NGO schools for other countries include Arif and Saqib (2003) 
and Khan and Kiefer (2007). Both studies utilize sample survey data from Pakistan.   
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To test for the presence of such externalities, we study the impact of NGO schools on 
secondary female enrollment growth in unions, an administrative unit bigger than village 
but smaller than sub-district3. First, we show in the context of regional growth in 
secondary (grades 6-10) female enrollment that the number of madrasas in a union is 
positively associated with growth rate even after controlling for sub-district fixed effects, 
initial enrollment level and various characteristics of registered secondary educational 
institutions. Next, we test how female enrollment growth in secondary madrasa is 
affected by the presence of BRAC schools. We find that madrasas located in unions with 
greater the number of BRAC schools have higher enrollment growth, once we correct for 
endogeneity of the number of BRAC schools in the union. 
 
Our findings point towards a new explanation for the recent boom in female enrollment 
in the madrasa sector. More importantly, they yield a new policy measure to reform 
madrasas in Muslim-majority countries. Traditional religious primary schools in a 
community may become redundant with the opening of NGO schools. But the positive 
effect of BRAC schools on female enrollment growth, we argue, represents a form of 
vertical externality: Bangladeshi regions with higher stock of BRAC schools have higher 
number of girls who are future entrants to secondary schools. This, combined with the 
introduction of a female secondary stipend (FSP) scheme, may have stimulated secondary 
school madrasas to open their gates to female students.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a comparison between 
the current government system of education and the system used by BRAC. Section 3 
discusses the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the main results and section 5 
concludes.  
2. Background 
The Bangladeshi education sector is characterized by presence of different types of 
schools which vary significantly across primary and secondary level. At the primary 
level, there are 11 types of schools. There are currently 37,000 government primary 
schools and 6000 registered madrasas in Bangladesh. Government schools are 
concentrated mostly in urban centers, resulting in a lack of educational access to the 
majority of children in the country who live in rural areas. This has motivated NGOs to 
set up schools so that children living in under-provided areas can acquire education. 
Today, there are over 400 NGOs in Bangladesh today involved with providing basic 
education. The number of NGO schools has increased four times since the early 1990s 
and now comprised 8.5% of the educational system in Bangladesh; most of these NGO 
schools are widely considered to be more effective than government schools.  
 
BRAC is the largest NGOs in the country working on primary education and account for 
76% of all NGO primary schools. The Non-Formal Primary Education Program of 
                                                 
3 Administratively the nation is divided into 6 divisions, 64 districts, 400+ sub-districts (upazilas), 4000+ 
unions and cluster of household (mouzas). A union on average comprises of 15 villages. A mouza may or 
may not be greater than a village but is always smaller than a union.  
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BRAC started in 1984 with only 22 pilot schools. BRAC’s education program began in 
rural areas where there were no alternative education options4.  Today there are more 
than 40,000 BRAC schools covering 50,000 out of 84,000 Bangladeshi villages.  
 
BRAC schools have a number of hallmarks. First, they cater to children who have never 
attended school as well as those who have dropped out of government or other schools. 
Similar to madrasas, BRAC (instead of the child’s family) bears most of the educational 
expenses5. A majority of the students in BRAC primary schools are from the poorest 
20% of the population. Second, 70 percent of children attending BRAC schools are 
female. Third, 97% of teachers in BRAC schools are married women and come from the 
same village where the school is located.  
                                                
 
Today, BRAC schools are regarded by many as a success story. First, BRAC students are 
found to have higher test scores when compared to students from government primary 
schools (Sukontamarn, 2005). Second, 90% of students who complete their primary 
schooling though BRAC continue into secondary education. Third, BRAC schools have 
been instrumental in retaining female students from poorer families in school 
(Sukontamarn, 2005).  
 
At the secondary level, on the other hand, there is no NGO school. Rather, education is 
provided by government schools, aided schools and madrasas. According to government 
census records for the year 2003, there are 8,406 institutions at post-primary level against 
17,389 secondary schools constituting approximately 26% of all post-primary education 
and 32.5% of all secondary educational institutions respectively. Madrasa enrollment 
accounts for 15% of total PPE enrollment6. Most madrasa education takes place in rural 
locations and rural learners account for 90.9% of madrasa enrollment, compared with 
around 77% in mainstream education. 
 
There is an important stylized fact about the secondary madrasa sector in Bangladesh. 
More than 90% of the registered secondary madrasas in Bangladesh today admit girls and 
half of the students enrolled in these schools are girls (Asadullah and Chaudhury, 2007). 
This ‘feminization’ of the secondary madrasa system in Bangladesh is a recent 
phenomenon. Female enrollment boom in religious schools has been driven by the 
conversion of formerly all-male, un/registered madrasas into registered centers for co-
education. This reflects the confluence of two hybrid (supply and demand side) 
conditional cash incentive schemes. First, the government took over responsibility over 
teacher pay in madrasas conditional upon formal registration and introduced of modern 
subjects (math, science, etc).  Then the government introduced the FSP project which 
allowed rural females to go to any registered school (public, private, religious) of their 
choice (payment was conditional upon enrolling in secondary school).  Furthermore any 
 
4 However, since 1992 BRAC additionally began constructing schools in urban slums. 
5 Whilst BRAC bears majority of the expenses, the cost of maintaining the classrooms are the responsibility 
of the community. Communities are involved in deciding locations and schedules of schools as well as 
providing labor and materials to build schools. 
6 In contrast, Madrasas in Pakistan account for less than 1% of total school enrollment (Andrabi et al., 
2006).  
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type of school participating in this project received government funding depending upon 
the number of females enrolled in the school.  This additional incentive induced many 
formally all-male madrasas to open their gates to female students.   
 
The modernization scheme originally initiated in the early 1980s has succeeded in 
converting a large pool of orthodox, all-male madrasas which previously operated with 
own funds and eschewed teaching of modern subjects. Secondary madrasas therefore 
grew in numbers in Bangladesh in two distinct phases. The modernization scheme of 
1980s saw a surge in numbers between 1980 and 1994. In post-1994 years, growth was 
driven mostly via enrollment of female students and allegedly by transforming formerly 
all-boy madrasas into centers for co-education. This feminization of modernised 
madrasas in Bangladesh dispels the common view that the rise of the religious education 
sector is explained away only by a lack of public provision7.  
 
These features of the religious education system in Bangladesh provide important policy 
leverage in harmonizing schooling outcomes among students from diverse educational 
backgrounds. This scenario is at stark contrast with other countries in South Asia with 
large Muslim populations (and elsewhere), where most religious seminaries are of 
traditional orthodox types, predominantly single-sex (boys only), and still untouched by 
any significant changes in curriculum. Therefore, understanding the nature and process of 
female enrollment growth in madrasas is important to correctly inform the current debate 
over madrasa reform in other South Asian countries such as India and Pakistan. 
 
Although the importance of the FSP scheme in feminizing the madrasa sector is well-
acknowledged, relatively less is understood about the nature of growth of female 
enrollment in madrasas. Given that these secondary madrasas mostly rely on primary 
schools and primary madrasas for the supply of new students, it is of policy interest to 
examine whether female enrollee of madrasas come from secular education sector, in 
particular NGO schools which promote secular values, cater to children from poorer 
households and has an explicit agenda to empower rural women. Table 1 presents data on 
the type of primary school attended by grade 8 students in a sample of 221 secondary 
schools and 94 madrasas drawn from rural Bangladesh8. 9% of the female secondary 
students attended NGO schools for primary education which is consistent with the fact 
that BRAC schools predominantly educate girls. More importantly, madrasa and school 
girls are equally likely to have attended NGO schools for primary education.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The relevance of this hypothesis for Pakistan is also questioned by some researchers (e.g. see Andrabi et 
al., 2006). 
8 The survey was conducted in the year 2005 in 60 rural unions. For a detailed description, see Asadullah et 
al. (2007).  
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Table 1: Raw probability of enrollment in secondary school/madrasa by gender and 
primary school type 
 
Primary 
school 
attended Female Male 
Female, 
madrasa 
Female, 
school 
Male, 
madrasa 
Male, 
school 
 Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd 
Government 0.65 0.48 0.66 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.68 0.46 0.42 0.49 0.73 0.45
Private/aided 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.13 0.33 0.20 0.40 0.12 0.33 0.21 0.41
Madrasa 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.24 0.17 0.38 0.01 0.07 0.26 0.44 0.01 0.10
NGO 0.09 0.28 0.04 0.19 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19
Secondary 
school 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.11 0.32 0.01 0.11 0.14 0.35 0.01 0.08
N 5273  3202  1057  4216  696  2506  
Source: Author’s calculation based on sample survey data. 
The finding that NGO school graduates make up for a significant fraction of secondary 
school students today is an important finding: it suggests that a good number of female 
students who studied in NGO-run primary schools continue into secondary education. 
But the fact that NGO school graduates today penetrate madrasas and schools pari passu 
is important considering the fact that madrasa and NGO schools pursue conflicting  
ideologies and just a decade ago secondary madrasas were seldom open to female 
students. As a matter of fact, greater NGO school activities could have created pressure 
on nearby secondary madrasas in the community which have historically catered to boys 
only to open up and absorb female students. Prospect for such vertical externality is high 
because NGOs and Islamic faith schools both serve marginalized communities where 
provision for state aided education is relatively scarce. Despite similar motives, NGOs 
and Islamic schools in Bangladesh operate in different levels of the education system. 
NGO schools are exclusively concentrated in the primary sector whereas the registered 
madrasas operate in both primary and secondary sectors9. Therefore, while BRAC run 
schools compete with primary madrasas for students, their presence in the community 
can create significant externalities for secondary madrasas. Moreover, given that BRAC 
schools primarily cater to female students, any potential spillover effects on religious 
schools will have to operate through enrollment of female students in madrasas.  If so, 
evidence of such externalities has important policy implications as promoting female 
education and closing gender gap in secondary enrollment is a key MDG target. 
 
To formally, test this proposition, we need data on enrollment in madrasas across villages 
with and without NGO schools along with information on when the NGO school was set 
up. In the absence of such data, we test this proposition by looking at female enrollment 
data (aggregated at school level) and see how this correlates with the presence of BRAC 
schools in the community. This is discussed in the next section. 
 
                                                 
9 There are about 6000 primary registered madrasas as opposed to 8404 secondary madrasas in Bangladesh.  
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3. Data and methodology 
The existing census (cross-sectional) dataset on schools and madrasas contains annual 
enrollment figures spanning the period 1999-200310. The dataset includes information on 
all secondary educational institutions (25,795 in total) in the 64 districts of Bangladesh. 
We use the 2003 round of the Census dataset, which provides information on all 
registered religious and secular post-primary educational institutions. Having sex and 
grade-specific data on enrollment in each secondary school for the years 1999-2003, it is 
possible to study the supply-side determinants of growth in total number of girls enrolled 
at the regional as well as school/madrasa level. We further merge these data to two 
unique datasets which provide union-level information on the number of BRAC schools 
and thana-level information on the number of BRAC branches and female members.  
Both of the latter datasets provide information on all BRAC schools and branches in the 
country.  
 
Our objective in this paper is to test whether (i) presence of madrasas in a region (i.e. 
union) bolsters enrollment of female students and if so, (ii) whether madrasas located in 
regions with more BRAC schools have seen a higher growth in enrollment of female 
students11. Given the availability of data on annual student enrollment for four years, we 
do so by analyzing the determinants of enrollment growth across Bangladesh regions or 
unions (which are on average a cluster of 15 villages) in a simple cross-section regression 
framework.  We follow the empirical income growth literature and specify a regression 
model of female enrollment growth. To capture convergence effect, we allow growth 
during 1999-2003 to depend on enrollment at the beginning of the period. Since we also 
want to know school type effects, our growth equation includes the level of school 
availability by type in 1999 and changes therein by 2003. This yields the following 
reduced form model of enrollment growth at the region (i.e. union) level: 
  
Gti = β0 + β1 Et-4+ β2 X t-4,i + β3 ΔXit + β4Wti+ ϖt + υti  (1) 
  
where,  
  
Gti = Regional growth rate of female enrollment during 1999-2003 
Et-4 = Regional enrollment in 1999 
X2 =Mean characteristics of educational institutions of the region in 1999 
ΔXti = change in # of schools and madrasas between 1999 and 2003 
Wti = Other attributes of the union (e.g. whether an urban region; average age of school/madrasa in 
the region; presence of a government school in the region) 
ϖt = Sub-districts (Upazila) fixed-effects 
υit= iid random error 
t = time index  
i = union index 
 
                                                 
10 The Census has been conducted by the Ministry of Education, Government of Bangladesh. 
11 As many as 24% (N=1179) of the unions in Bangladesh do not have a secondary madrasa. 
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A common problem in equation (1) is that of endogeneity of number of madrasas 
admitting females. Presence/emergence of co-educational or girls-only madrasas could be 
driven by cultural factors: regions where there are less cultural restrictions on female 
mobility are more likely to see emergence/presence of “liberal” religious schools that also 
encourage education of girls. We address the concern over identification of religious 
school effect using sub-district fixed-effects. This requires sufficient sub-district level 
variation in norms and/or a dataset with a large number of sub-districts. In the year 2003, 
there were 486 sub-districts (upazilas) in Bangladesh and our dataset contained all 
secondary schools in the country. Within the context of Bangladesh, socio-economic 
differences are usually across regions and districts - therefore, we can study growth in 
enrollment at the union level controlling for unobservables in a fixed-effect framework.   
 
For our purpose, we create a dataset aggregated at the union level. Appendix Table 1 
provides a summary of key variables. The period of 1999-2003 has seen exceptional 
growth in total female enrollment in secondary schools. At the union level, the average 
growth rate is 21%. But looking at enrollment in grade 10, this figure is as high as 31%12. 
 
To examine the effect of BRAC schools on female enrollment growth in secondary 
grades in madrasas, we expand equation (1) by additionally including total number of 
BRAC schools in the union as a regressor on the RHS and estimate this equation at the 
madrasa level. The equation, when re-written, appears as follows:  
 
Gti = α0 + α2 X t-4,i + α3 ΔXit + α4Wti+ α5(# of BRAC schools in the union)i+ δt + εti     (2) 
 
where,  
  
Gti = growth rate of female enrollment in secondary madrasas during 1999-2003 
δt = Districts fixed-effects 
υit= iid random error 
t = time index  
i = union index 
 
Equation (2) is estimated using establishment (i.e. madrasa or school) level data. The 
number of BRAC schools in the union in equation (2) is treated as endogenous. Madrasas 
that are located in poorer areas are likely to have experienced higher growth in female 
enrollment because of the FSP intervention. Yet, these regions would have a greater 
concentration of BRAC schools. Therefore, presence of BRAC schools could merely 
proxy for local poverty and hence endogenous. We correct for this endogeneity problem 
in an instrumental variable framework where we use data on the number of BRAC 
branches and the number of BRAC female members as excluded instruments. 
                                                 
12A similar pattern is observed form gross enrollment statistics. According to BANBEIS, gross female 
enrollment rate at secondary level in school (total # of females enrolled in secondary school/total # of 11-15 
years old in the population) has increased from 42.5% to 48.4% between 1999 and 2003. 
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4. Results 
Table 2 reports regression estimates of enrollment growth models using growth rate in 
total female enrollment (grades 6-10). For each dependent variable, three regression 
specifications are used. Specification (1) controls for district fixed-effects. Specification 
(2) controls for sub-district (upazila) level fixed-effects. Specification (3) replaces the 
variables - total number of schools in 1999 and total number of madrasas in 1999 – by 
gender-disaggregated versions (e.g. coeducation, boys-only, girls-only). 
 
Table 2: Determinants of regional enrollment growth (1999-2003) [Dependent variable: 
Regional growth rate of total female enrollment, grades 6-10] 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
total female enrollment in 1999 in the region, grade 6-10 (in logs) -0.274 -0.292 -0.296 
 (39.57)** (40.53)** (40.70)** 
female enrollment in 1999 in the region, grade 6 (in logs)    
    
female enrollment in 1999 in the region, grade 10 (in logs)    
    
# of madrasas in the region, 1999 0.018 0.025  
 (5.55)** (7.19)**  
# of schools in the region, 1999 0.054 0.061  
 (20.90)** (22.36)**  
Δ in # of madrasa (1999-2003) 0.057 0.075 0.074 
 (2.76)** (3.52)** (3.49)** 
Δ in # of school (1999-2003) 0.085 0.093 0.096 
 (7.09)** (7.49)** (7.69)** 
Mean age of schools -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (4.39)** (4.12)** (3.38)** 
Mean age of madrasas 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (2.80)** (2.32)* (2.95)** 
# of co-educational madrasas in the region, 1999   0.022 
   (5.25)** 
# of girls-only madrasas in the region, 1999   0.045 
   (5.61)** 
# of boys-only madrasas in the region, 1999   -0.015 
   (0.68) 
# of co-educational schools in the region, 1999   0.062 
   (20.32)** 
# of girls-only school in the region, 1999   0.071 
   (13.28)** 
# of boys-only schools in the region, 1999   0.019 
   (1.69)+ 
Govt (=1 if a government secondary school present) 0.037 0.040 0.058 
 (2.08)* (2.28)* (3.15)** 
Urban -0.002 -0.016 -0.011 
 (0.13) (1.05) (0.71) 
Constant 1.793 1.873 1.888 
 (46.31)** (46.67)** (46.45)** 
N 4784 4784 4784 
R-squared 0.29 0.32 0.32 
Fixed-effects District Thana Thana 
Note: (1) Unit of analysis is region (union). (2) Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. + significant at 
10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
A number of results are obtained from Table 2. First, there is clear evidence of 
convergence: regions with higher initial enrollment (in 1999) experienced slower growth. 
Second, between 1999 and 2003, regions with more schools had a higher growth rate in 
enrollment. But more importantly, regions with more madrasas experienced higher 
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growth although the rate was less than that owing to presence of schools. Third, increase 
in the number of madrasa in the region during 2000-2003 had a positive and significant 
effect. Fourth, increase in the mean age of madrasas in the region positively affects 
enrollment growth. We conjecture that older madrasas, which previously educated only 
boys and have now become co-educational are driving this result. As a direct test of this 
hypothesis, we replace the age variable by “fraction of madrasas in the region that are 
converts (i.e. set up before the reform of 1980)” (see Appendix Table 2). Indeed the 
variable has a positive, significant impact on enrollment growth. This finding suggests 
that orthodox madrasas that chose to covert into modern religious schools went beyond 
curriculum reform by withdrawing restrictions on admission of female students. 
 
It could be argued that our finding of the positive effect of number of madrasas captures 
union-specific unobservables. Should this be the case, we would even observe a positive 
correlation between presence of schools that do not admit girls and female enrollment. 
Disaggegating the stock variables (# of schools and madrasas) by type (coeducation, 
boys-only, girls-only) yield a consistent pattern, however (see specification 3, Table 2). 
The number of all-boys schools and madrasas in 1999 never has an impact on female 
enrollment growth. This serves as a placebo test and implies that the observed effect of 
presence of madrasas is unlikely to be capturing union-specific variables that are absent 
in our model13.  
 
Another concern over the estimates reported in Table 2 relates to the problem of reverse 
causality: Many madrasas were newly set up primarily as a response to the stipend 
scheme immediately after 1994. As a matter of fact, between 1995 and 2003, a total of 
3798 secondary educational institutions were set up throughout Bangladesh of which 
23.88% (or 907) were madrasas. If there is a correlation between female enrollment and 
madrasas that existed before introduction of the stipend reform, that can be taken as a 
cleaner test of the impact of madrasas on female enrollment. To this end, we restricted 
data to schools/madrasas established before 1994 and repeated our analysis. Results are 
reported in Appendix Table 314. However, even for this sub-sample, there is a robust 
relationship between # of madrasas in the region and female enrollment growth. 
 
From the results presented in Table 2 and Appendix Tables 2 and 3, positive impact of 
madrasas on female enrollment growth is evident. We further examined the impact such 
feminization had on achieving gender parity across Bangladeshi regions. To this end, we 
run regressions using specifications similar to those in Appendix Table 2 but used an 
indicator variable “whether the region achieved gender parity in 2003” instead as the 
outcome variable. Reassuringly, we find that regions with greater number of madrasas in 
1999 are more likely to achieve gender parity by 2003 (results available upon request).     
In sum, it is evident that reformed madrasas in Bangladesh have gone beyond adopting 
                                                 
13 As an alternative placebo test, we repeated the regressions using growth rate in boys enrollment as the 
dependent variable (results available upon request). Once again, presence of girl’s madrasa in the region 
had no impact on boy’s enrollment.  
14 Exclusion of pre-reform educational institutions leads to a fall in union level growth in secondary 
enrollment (19% as opposed to 30%). This implies that newly set up schools/madrasas following the 
introduction of the stipend scheme contributed more to female enrollment than older educational 
institutions. 
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modern curriculum by altering age-old practice of educating predominantly male students 
and embracing girls.  
 
Table 3: 2SLS estimates of determinants of female enrollment in secondary madrasas in 
2003 [Dependent variable: Total female enrollment in grades 6-10] 
 model 1  model 2  model 3  model 4  
 2SLS 1 stage 2SLS 1 stage 2SLS 1 stage 2SLS 1 stage 
# of BRAC schools in the union (in 2003) 0.053  0.026  0.071  0.037  
 (2.45)*  (1.73)+  (2.34)*  (2.16)*  
Madrasa is co-ed (base cat: female madrasa) 0.171 -0.462 0.145 -0.234 0.166 -0.244 0.142 -0.179 
 (5.57)** (1.79)+ (5.32)** -0.88 (5.32)** -0.99 (5.16)** -0.7 
Age of madrasa 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.007 
 (5.07)** -1.33 (5.04)** -1.43 (5.09)** -1.23 (5.23)** -1.54 
Union has a govt. school -0.106 0.83 -0.06 0.681 -0.035 0.449 -0.017 0.57 
 (1.84)+ (1.67)+ -1.05 -1.23 -0.69 -1.13 -0.34 -1.24 
Urban 0 0 0 0 0.349 -2.741 0.22 -1.811 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (3.87)** (8.73)** (4.27)** (4.76)** 
# of boys madrasas in the union in 1999   0.034 -0.853   0.038 -0.894 
   -0.9 (2.49)*   -0.98 (2.69)** 
# of girls madrasas in the union in 1999   -0.06 0.921   -0.07 0.937 
   (3.32)** (7.97)**   (3.48)** (8.29)** 
# of co-ed madrasas in the union in 1999   -0.01 0.238   -0.014 0.294 
   -1.36 (3.76)**   (1.76)+ (4.79)** 
# of boys schools in the union in 1999   0.009 -0.585   0.021 -0.826 
   -0.28 (1.90)+   -0.65 (3.06)** 
# of girls schools in the union in 1999   -0.02 -0.107   -0.016 -0.116 
   (2.08)* -1.15   -1.56 -1.28 
# of co-ed schools in the union in 1999   -0.01 0.141   -0.012 0.163 
   -1.42 (2.16)*   (1.68)+ (2.60)** 
# of new madrasas in the union during 1999-2003   0.052 -0.424   0.05 -0.304 
   -1.32 -1.11   -1.24 -0.82 
# of new schools in the union during 1999-2003   -0.045 1.243   -0.054 1.12 
   -1.54 (5.47)**   (1.81)+ (5.13)** 
Average age of madrasas in the union   0 0.012   0 0.013 
   -0.25 (1.98)*   -0.37 (2.28)* 
Average age of schools in the union   0 0.008   0 0.007 
   (1.89)+ (4.04)**   -1.47 (3.72)** 
# of BRAC branches in the union (in 2005)  0.305  0.388  0.229  0.35 
  (5.22)**  (6.18)**  (4.01)**  (5.73)** 
# of BRAC female members in the union (in 2005)  -3.003  6.027  -3.565  5.192 
  -0.94  (1.73)+  -1.14  -1.54 
Constant -0.261 8.295 -0.061 -3.467 -0.371 8.919 -0.091 -2.691 
 (1.86)+ (2.69)** -0.88 -1.02 (1.96)+ (2.97)** -1.23 -0.82 
N 6271 6271 5266 5266 6664 6664 5520 5520 
R-squared  0.01  0.05  0.01  0.05 
Note: (a) All regressions control for district fixed-effects. (b) All-boys madrasas are excluded from the sample. (c) Models 1 and 2 
exclude urban madrasas from the sample. 
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As argued earlier, feminization of madrasas is a recent phenomenon and from policy 
point of view, a clear understanding of the association between growth in female 
secondary enrollment and madrasas is extremely important. In this context, a potentially 
important explanation could be the rise of NGO schools such as BRAC’s non-formal 
primary schools which increased the number of girls completing primary education in the 
community. This in turn may create an upward pressure on local madrasas to open up to 
admitting female students. To test for the presence of such externalities, we report 
regression estimates of equation (2) at the madrasa level. Results are reported in Table 3. 
Each regression treats “the number of BRAC schools in the union” as an endogenous 
variable which is instrumented using data on “the number of BRAC branches” and “the 
number of BRAC female members”. Clearly, presence of BRAC schools in the union has 
a positive effect on female enrollment growth in madrasas.   
We also estimated equation (2) using data on secondary schools. However, BRAC 
schools had no impact on female enrollment growth in secondary schools (see Appendix 
Table 4). This suggests that the externality effect of BRAC schools is only specific to 
madrasas.  Lastly, the effect of BRAC school remains even when we use an alternative 
measure where we replace “the number of BRAC schools” by “the number of female 
students enrolled in BRAC schools” (see Appendix Table 5). Once again, BRAC variable 
is treated as an endogenous regressor. We find that the number of female students 
enrolled in BRAC schools positively affects enrollment growth in madrasas. 
 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play an increasingly important role in the 
delivery of public goods in developing countries. Although this role is well 
acknowledged in the development literature, relatively less known is the potential 
externalities that arise from independent NGO interventions in the form of impact on the 
formal, conventional providers of public services such as state and state-aided private 
bodies.  
 
We test for the presence of such externalities for Bangladesh where different types of 
service providers are present in the education sector. Alongside for-profit schools, there 
exist BRAC schools and madrasas that arguably charge relatively minor fees and serve 
economically marginalized children and isolated communities. Given that BRAC schools 
operate exclusively in the primary sector as opposed to madrasas (that have a greater 
presence in the secondary sector), any effect of BRAC schools on secondary madrasas 
would be taken as an evidence of a spill-over effect on the latter. 
 
Externality effect of NGO intervention is studied in the context of the recent feminization 
of the madrasa sector where a previously predominantly all-boys religious education 
system opened up to girls. First, we find that Bangladeshi regions that had more 
registered madrasas saw a higher growth in enrollment of girls in secondary grades 
(holding number of secular secondary schools constant and initial enrollment) during 
1999-2003. Regions that had more “converted” madrasas also experienced higher 
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enrollment growth. This correlation holds even for the sample of older, pre-existing 
religious schools and hence corroborates the hypothesis that madrasas have encouraged 
greater female participation in secondary education rather than selectively emerging in 
regions where households have responded to the stipend scheme by sending daughters to 
schools. These findings highlight the previously undocumented role played by religious 
schools in removing gender disparity in rural Bangladesh. 
 
Next, we explored to what extent feminization of secondary madasas is driven by the 
presence of BRAC schools in the union by using madrasa level enrollment data. We 
found that madrasas located in regions with larger number of BRAC schools saw a 
greater growth in female enrollment where presence of BRAC schools in the union is 
treated as endogenous. The effect of BRAC schools remains even when we use an 
alternative measure where we replace the number of BRAC schools by the number of 
female students enrolled in BRAC schools.  
 
Such externality effect on madrasas is unusual but not surprising considering the fact that 
both BRAC schools and madrasas are inspired by non-profit motives and target relatively 
poorer regions15. Entry of NGO schools, which only operate at the primary level, 
therefore can put pressure on secondary madrasas in the community which usually cater 
to boys, compelling them to open up to girls -- greater NGO activities can have 
unintended consequences in the form of a positive, complementary spill-over effects. Our 
finding therefore not only provides a new explanation for the rise in female enrollment in 
religious schools in Bangladesh, it also highlights yet another policy rationale to support 
and promote the type of targeted services delivered by NGOs in the rural areas.  
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Appendix Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Additional description Mean
Std. 
Dev.
      
Growth rate of female enrollment (grades 6-10) in the region Ln(enrollment in 2003) - Ln(enrollment in 1999) 0.21 0.29
Growth rate of female enrollment (grade 6) in the region Ln(enrollment in 2003) - Ln(enrollment in 1999) 0.11 0.35
Growth rate of female enrollment (grade 10) in the region Ln(enrollment in 2003) - Ln(enrollment in 1999) 0.31 0.45
Total female enrollment in 1999 in the region in natural logs 6.56 0.78
Total female enrollment in grade 6 in 1999 in the region in natural logs 5.27 0.76
Total female enrollment in grade 10 in 1999 in the region in natural logs 4.53 0.83
# of co-educational madrasas in the region, 1999  1.73 1.66
# of girls-only madrasas in the region, 1999  3.54 2.17
# of boys-only madrasas in the region, 1999  1.50 1.40
# of co-educational schools in the region, 1999  0.19 0.49
# of girls-only school in the region, 1999  0.03 0.17
# of boys-only schools in the region, 1999  2.74 1.70
Δ in # of madrasa (1999-2003) Change in # of madrasas in the region,, 1999-2003 0.70 0.89
Δ in # of school (1999-2003) Change in # of schools in the region,, 1999-2003 0.10 0.37
Mean age of schools  0.03 0.17
Mean age of madrasas  0.08 0.31
Fraction of madrasas in the region (in 1999) who are convertsConverts are madrasas established before 1980 0.39 0.41
Urban Fraction of urban schools 0.13 0.31
Govt Whether any government school in the region 0.05 0.22
Number of BRAC schools    
Number of BRAC branches    
Number of BRAC female members    
N  4784  
 Note: Region refers to “union”, an administrative unit which is smaller than sub-district 
(Upazila) but bigger than village (usually comprising of 10-15 villages). 
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Appendix Table 2: Determinants of regional enrollment growth (1999-2003) – alternative 
specification, OLS estimates  
total female enrollment in 1999 in the region, grade 6-10 (in logs)  -0.293 
 (40.54)** 
Female enrollment in 1999 in the region, grade 6 (in logs) -- 
  
Female enrollment in 1999 in the region, grade 10 (in logs) -- 
  
# of madrasas in the region, 1999 0.028 
 (8.81)** 
# of schools in the region, 1999 0.060 
 (22.82)** 
Δ in # of madrasa (1999-2003) 0.075 
 (3.53)** 
Δ in # of school (1999-2003) 0.092 
 (7.37)** 
Mean age of schools -0.001 
 (4.29)** 
Fraction of madrasas in the region being “converts” (established pre-1980) 0.024 
 (2.68)** 
Urban  -0.016 
 (1.03) 
Govt (=1 if a government secondary school present)  0.041 
 (2.32)* 
Constant 1.882 
 (47.01)** 
N 4784 
R-squared 0.32 
Fixed-effects Thana 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at  
1%. 
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Appendix Table 3: Determinants of regional enrollment growth (1999-2003) -- Sample of 
older schools 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
total female enrollment in 1999 in the region, grade 6-10 
(in logs) -0.222 -0.230 -0.233 
 (32.11)** (32.14)** (32.16)** 
female enrollment in 1999 in the region, grade 6 (in logs)    
    
female enrollment in 1999 in the region, grade 10 (in 
logs)    
    
# of madrasas in the region, 1999 0.017 0.022  
 (4.90)** (5.95)**  
# of schools in the region, 1999 0.051 0.058  
 (17.74)** (19.31)**  
Δ in # of madrasa (1999-2003) - - - 
 - - - 
Δ in # of school (1999-2003) - - - 
 - - - 
Mean age of schools -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.59) (1.43) (0.82) 
Mean age of madrasas 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (4.20)** (3.67)** (4.08)** 
# of co-educational madrasas in the region, 1999   0.020 
   (4.70)** 
# of girls-only madrasas in the region, 1999   0.036 
   (4.02)** 
# of boys-only madrasas in the region, 1999   -0.002 
   (0.10) 
# of co-educational schools in the region, 1999   0.060 
   (18.13)** 
# of girls-only school in the region, 1999   0.064 
   (10.91)** 
# of boys-only schools in the region, 1999   0.019 
   (1.68)+ 
Govt (=1 if a government secondary school present) 0.018 0.019 0.038 
 (1.06) (1.10) (2.10)* 
Urban 0.015 -0.009 -0.001 
 (1.14) (0.61) (0.07) 
Constant 1.381 1.417 1.427 
 (35.75)** (35.40)** (35.01)** 
N 4737 4737 4737 
R-squared 0.20 0.22 0.22 
Fixed-effects District Thana Thana 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at  
1%. 
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Appendix Table 4:  2SLS estimates of determinants of female enrollment in secondary 
schools in 2003 [Dependent variable: Total female enrollment in grades 6-10] 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 2SLS 1 stage 2SLS 1 stage 2SLS 1 stage 2SLS 1 stage 
# of BRAC schools in the union (in 2003) 0.007  0.013  0.007  0.014  
 (0.6)  (1.14)  (0.62)  (1.28)  
School is co-ed (base cat: female school)   0.084 -0.149   0.086 -0.165 
   (8.74)** -1   (9.10)** -1.15 
Age of school   -0.003 -0.003   -0.003 -0.003 
   (16.30)** -1.17   (16.40)** -1.02 
Union has a govt. school 0.008 0.832 0.021 0.261 0.002 0.437 0.026 0.095 
 -0.36 (2.61)** -1.02 -0.79 -0.13 -1.54 -1.32 -0.32 
Urban 0 0 0 0 0.064 -2.671 0.085 -2.565 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) -1.57 (7.52)** (2.17)* (7.21)** 
# of boys madrasas in the union in 1999   0.028 -0.988   0.023 -0.644 
   -1.26 (3.34)**   -1.19 (2.30)* 
# of girls madrasas in the union in 1999   -0.021 0.546   -0.02 0.54 
   (2.30)* (5.15)**   (2.22)* (5.20)** 
# of co-ed madrasas in the union in 1999   -0.011 0.09   -0.012 0.11 
   (2.64)** -1.36   (2.72)** (1.69)+ 
# of boys schools in the union in 1999   -0.009 -0.316   -0.018 -0.297 
   -0.63 -1.52   -1.43 -1.58 
# of girls schools in the union in 1999   -0.014 -0.251   -0.012 -0.248 
   (2.65)** (3.67)**   (2.27)* (3.75)** 
# of co-ed schools in the union in 1999   -0.01 0.223   -0.011 0.22 
   (2.73)** (4.83)**   (3.10)** (5.23)** 
# of new madrasas in the union during 1999-2003   -0.006 -0.32   -0.006 -0.302 
   -0.35 -1.3   -0.4 -1.25 
# of new schools in the union during 1999-2003   -0.017 0.453   -0.017 0.475 
   -1.6 (3.06)**   (1.66)+ (3.27)** 
Average age of madrasas in the union   0 0.008   0 0.007 
   -0.12 (3.95)**   -0.08 (3.82)** 
Average age of schools in the union   0 0.008   0 0.007 
   (2.56)* (5.85)**   (2.41)* (5.37)** 
# of BRAC branches in the union (in 2005)  0.205  0.229  0.206  0.233 
  (5.01)**  (5.64)**  (5.15)**  (5.89)** 
# of BRAC female members in the union (in 2005)  -5.637  -1.349  -5.547  -1.535 
  (2.48)*  -0.6  (2.53)*  -0.71 
Constant 0.062 10.812 0.087 4.452 0.061 10.654 0.084 4.661 
 -0.89 (4.93)** (1.89)+ (2.03)* -0.88 (5.03)** (1.86)+ (2.20)* 
N 12744 12744 12744 12744 13196 13196 13196 13196 
R-squared  0.00  0.03  0.01  0.04 
Note: (a) All regressions control for district Fes. (b) All-boys madrasas are excluded from the sample. (c) Models 1 and 2 exclude 
urban schools from the sample. 
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Appendix Table 5:  2SLS estimates of determinants of female enrollment in secondary 
madrasas and schools in 2003  
 
Dependent variable: total female enrollment in 
grades 6-10 in Madrasa 
Dependent variable: total female 
enrollment in grades 6-10 in school 
# of girls enrolled in BRAC schools in the union (in 2003) 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0 0.001 0 0.001 
 (2.50)* (1.74)+ (2.45)* (2.17)* (0.6) (1.1) (0.65) (1.26) 
Madrasa is co-ed (base cat: female madrasa) 0.168 0.144 0.163 0.141     
 (5.66)** (5.32)** (5.46)** (5.17)**     
Age of madrasa 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003     
 (5.28)** (5.09)** (5.41)** (5.32)**     
School is co-ed (base cat: female school)      0.084  0.086 
      (8.77)**  (9.13)** 
Age of school      -0.003  -0.003 
      (16.41)**  (16.50)** 
Union has a govt. school -0.103 -0.061 -0.032 -0.016 0.008 0.022 0.003 0.026 
 (1.83)+ -1.06 -0.66 -0.33 -0.39 -1.04 -0.14 -1.35 
Urban   0.325 0.215   0.063 0.081 
   (4.20)** (4.32)**   (1.65)+ (2.20)* 
# of boys madrasas in the union in 1999  0.033  0.038  0.027  0.022 
  -0.9  -0.98  -1.24  -1.16 
# of girls madrasas in the union in 1999  -0.058  -0.068  -0.02  -0.019 
  (3.37)**  (3.54)**  (2.29)*  (2.22)* 
# of co-ed madrasas in the union in 1999  -0.01  -0.014  -0.011  -0.012 
  -1.37  (1.76)+  (2.63)**  (2.72)** 
# of boys schools in the union in 1999  0.007  0.017  -0.01  -0.019 
  -0.22  -0.56  -0.71  -1.52 
# of girls schools in the union in 1999  -0.02  -0.015  -0.014  -0.012 
  (2.06)*  -1.55  (2.77)**  (2.35)* 
# of co-ed schools in the union in 1999  -0.01  -0.012  -0.01  -0.011 
  -1.4  (1.66)+  (2.76)**  (3.13)** 
# of new madrasas in the union during 1999-2003  0.048  0.044  -0.006  -0.007 
  -1.21  -1.11  -0.39  -0.43 
# of new schools in the union during 1999-2003  -0.04  -0.047  -0.016  -0.016 
  -1.45  (1.69)+  -1.55  -1.6 
Average age of madrasas in the union  0  0  0  0 
  -0.29  -0.31  -0.05  -0.01 
Average age of schools in the union  0  0  0  0 
  (1.97)*  -1.57  (2.76)**  (2.59)** 
Constant -0.226 -0.052 -0.32 -0.079 0.066 0.093 0.062 0.089 
 (1.83)+ -0.8 (1.99)* -1.15 -1.03 (2.18)* -0.99 (2.14)* 
N 6271 5266 6664 5520 12744 12744 13196 13196 
 
